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Vindicating Statutory Employment Rights in the Age of Mandatory Arbitration: State 
Attorney General Parens Patriae Litigation as an Alternative to Class Actions 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”)1 embodied a congressional attempt to 
ameliorate the systematic power imbalance between employers and employees. The provisions 
of the FLSA, Justice Frank Murphy eloquently observed, 
are remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere 
chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who 
sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others. 
Those are the rights that Congress has specially legislated to protect. Such a 
statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.2 
 
However, the FLSA’s remedial purpose, along with the purposes of other remedial employment 
statutes, has become threatened by the rise of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts. “It has become routine,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in 2015, “for powerful 
economic enterprises to write into their form contracts with consumers and employees no-class-
action arbitration clauses.”3 Critiquing recent Supreme Court decisions that have made class 
action bars in mandatory arbitration clauses nearly untouchable, she observed that those 
decisions “have predictably resulted in the deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for 
losses, and, turning the coin, they have insulated powerful economic interests from liability for 
violations of consumer-protection laws.”4 
Employment statutes such as the FLSA allow employees, through the threat of litigation, 
to prevent employers from abusing inherent workplace power imbalances.5 Individual claims, 
                                                 
1 29 U.S.C. § 8 (2012). 
2 Tenn. Coal, Iron, and R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). 
3 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
4 Id. at 477. 
5 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 71, 78 (2014). 
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however, particularly in the wage and hour area, are often too small to support legal 
representation, even on a contingent basis. Where such claims are widespread under a particular 
employer, a class action can allow employees to bundle their claims into aggregate litigation that 
is economically viable for both the employees and for their legal counsel. 
Class actions, however, are increasingly unavailable to employees. Employers are 
increasingly requiring their employees to agree to mandatory arbitration contracts that not only 
preclude litigation, but bar both class action and class arbitration. Thus, where such contracts bar 
group actions, employees with low-value but otherwise legitimate statutory claims will be 
effective prevented from vindicating those claims in any forum.6 Part I of this paper discusses the 
historical background of this problem, including the growing hostility toward class actions in the 
1980s, the rise of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act as a “superstatute” in the 1980s, and the 
subsequent growth of mandatory arbitration clauses by employers. Part II compares arbitration 
and litigation under a four-part test that judges systems of employment relations based on their 
effect on employees’ access to justice, concluding that arbitration produces significantly lower 
success rates and average damages than litigation, while replicating the adverse screening effects 
of litigation criticized by arbitration advocates. Finally, Part III examines parens patriae suits by 
state attorneys general under this test as a possible replacement for traditional employment class 
actions, comparing them both to traditional class actions and to mandatory individual arbitration. 
Part III concludes that while reliance on parens suits to replace class actions would likely lead to 
great disparity among states in employees’ access to justice, such suits are nevertheless a 
superior alternative to individual arbitration for vindicating employee statutory rights. 
                                                 
6 I will refer to class actions and class arbitrations together as “group actions.” Others have used the term “collective 
actions,” but that term risks confusion with the National Labor Relations Act’s guarantee of the right to concerted 
activity in 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012), which is often referred to as “collective action.” 
3 
 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION 
The growth of mandatory individual arbitration has two primary roots in the 1980s: a 
growing distrust of, and even hostility toward, class actions, and the development of the Federal 
Arbitration Act as a “superstatute,” primarily through Supreme Court jurisprudence. This Part 
will examine how these two roots have combined to create a difficult environment for employees 
to vindicate claims against their employers, particularly claims with low individual values. 
A. The Class Action Critique 
Legal scholars have long recognized two fundamental purposes of class actions: 
deterrence, by imposing damages against defendants who violate the law, and compensation, by 
remunerating those harmed by such violations.7 However, the legal community has become 
increasingly suspicious, and even hostile, toward class actions since the 1980s.8 This movement 
largely grew out of the work of John Coffee, who stresses the compensationalist function of class 
actions while largely ignoring their deterrent function.9 Coffee analyzes the class action from an 
economic perspective, considering plaintiffs’ attorneys in class actions with low individual 
damages as “independent economic entrepreneur[s]” because these low individual damages 
would lead to low client control by individual plaintiffs.10 Since awarded attorneys’ fees 
typically decrease, as a percentage of the total award, as the total award increases, Coffee argues 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys are incentivized to settle for smaller total damages, whereas they might 
otherwise expend more resources to achieve a larger total settlement.11 Thus, Coffee concludes, 
                                                 
7 A history of legal scholars’ views on class actions is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of this history 
regarding small-claims class actions and the tension between the deterrence and compensation principles, see 
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of 
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (Nov. 2006). 
8 Id. at 122-31. 
9 Id. at 108-16. 
10 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 (May 1986). 
11 Id. at 686. 
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“[i]f we assume that the plaintiff’s attorney acts as a rational entrepreneur in deciding to bring, 
maintain, or settle litigation, it follows that investment in class and derivative actions will tend to 
be underfunded in terms of the clients’ preferences.”12 If fees are rather awarded to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys at an hourly rate, Coffee argues that plaintiffs’ situation goes from bad to worse. This 
structure, he claims, “enables collusion [between plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants] to occur 
on an implicit, rather than explicit, basis,” since plaintiffs’ attorneys can accumulate billable 
hours while the defendant, in silent complicity, waits to offer a low settlement offer.13 
Following Coffee’s influential critique of class actions as ineffective vehicles for 
individual compensation, Congress, the judicial system, and government agencies have taken 
significant steps to “reform” the class action.14 Following a pair of Supreme Court decisions in 
the late 1990s increasing the difficulty of settling class actions,15 in 2011, the Court’s 
conservative majority, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, imported the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure’s stringent damages class certification requirements to all class certifications.16 This 
decision appears to have led to significant negative effects in the area of employment 
discrimination class actions. While the decision may not have increased the level of hostility in 
the courts toward class actions in general, it is likely responsible, at least in part, for a recent 
decline in the number of class filings, the decrease in the size of proposed classes, and the 
decreased number and size of settlements.17 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 718. 
14 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 7, at 122-31. 
15 Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1919 (June 2000) (discussing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)). 
16 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
17 Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions after Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON 
L. REV. 802, 804 (2015). This decline is also likely attributable to the impact of AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion 
and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 22-30.  
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B. The Growth of the FAA as Superstatute 
While hostility toward class actions has been rising since the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
has at the same time facilitated the growth of mandatory arbitration contracts, including in the 
employment context. In 2001, William Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn described the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) as one of a group of “superstatutes,” which they defined as statutes that 
can “penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a deep way,”18 that “tend to trump 
ordinary legislation when there are clashes or inconsistencies, even when principles of 
construction would suggest the opposite,” and that are often imbued with powers “beyond the 
four corners of [their] plain meaning[s].”19 The FAA’s superstatute status is plainly demonstrated 
by a string of Supreme Court decisions that dramatically expanded the FAA’s scope and power.  
In 1985, the Court held in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth that the 
FAA extended to statutory claims, in apparent contradiction of the FAA’s plain meaning and 
legislative history.20 The Court found that compelling arbitration of a Sherman Antitrust Act 
claim would not frustrate the purpose of that statute. “[S]o long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” wrote Justice 
Blackmun, “the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”21 
Following Mitsubishi Motors, jurisdictions developed case law interpreting the FAA’s 
provision that agreements to arbitrate may be revoked “upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”22 In 2005, for example, the California Supreme Court 
held that a class action waiver in an adhesion contract was unconscionable as a matter of law if 
                                                 
18 William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1260 (March 2001). 
19 Id. at 1216. 
20 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 646 (1985) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“Nothing 
in the text of the 1925 Act, nor its legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of 
any statutory claims.”). 
21 Id. at 637. 
22 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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disputes between the parties predictably concerned small sums, and if it was alleged that the 
party in the superior bargaining position executed “a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”23 But in 2011, the Supreme Court ruled, 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, that state law could not declare arbitration clauses barring 
group actions unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability.24 In that case, the plaintiffs had 
challenged an arbitration clause as unconscionable as applied to their low-value claims of 
$30.22, because it barred class arbitration and thereby prevented them from a financially viable 
path to pursuing their claim. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, 
Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote that were state law able to declare class arbitration waivers 
unconscionable under the FAA’s savings clause, it would allow the FAA to “destroy itself.”25  
While Mitsubishi Motors suggested that an arbitration clause that prevented effective 
vindication of a statutory claim might not be upheld, the Court ruled in 2013’s American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant arbitration clauses must be enforced even when they prevent 
claimants from being able to vindicate their statutory claims in a financially viable manner.26 
There, plaintiff restaurant owners, alleging an anti-trust violation, were barred from class 
arbitration of a statutory claim with maximum damages of $38,549, which, to pursue, would 
likely cost them over $1 million.27 The class arbitration bar would thus prevent them from 
effectively vindicating their federal statutory rights, the plaintiffs argued.28 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the same slim majority as in AT&T Mobility, found that only an individual’s right to initiate a 
statutory claim requires protection; thus, an arbitration clause that prohibited a particular 
                                                 
23 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
24 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
25 Id. at 343. 
26 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 




statutory claim from being tried or arbitrated at all could be overturned.29 While arbitration filing 
and administrative fees so high “as to make access to the forum impracticable” would “perhaps” 
be grounds to question an arbitration clause, the Court held that the cost of pursuing a potential 
class claim on an individual basis, with effective representation and expert witnesses, cannot be 
considered to prevent effective vindication of the claim.30  
This expansion of the FAA is particularly ironic in the employment context, because the 
plain language of the statute seems to exclude all employment contracts under Congress’s 
jurisdiction. The law’s very first section states that “nothing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce.”31 Congress’s ability to regulate employment contracts is 
grounded in its Commerce Power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce; thus, by stating 
that the law does not apply to employment contracts for workers engaged in such commerce, the 
FAA would appear to state that all employment contracts that Congress has the power to regulate 
under the Commerce Clause cannot be touched by the FAA.32 This interpretation is also 
supported by legislative history, as the specific mention of seamen and railroad workers was 
inserted to allay union members’ fears that the FAA would compel workers to sign employment 
contracts without any procedural or constitutional protections.33 Moreover, William H. H. Piatt, 
one of the FAA’s drafters, testified in Senate subcommittee hearings on the bill that it “is not 
intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants 
                                                 
29 Id. at 2310. 
30 Id. at 2310-11 (citing Green-Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)). 
31 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
32 See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 138 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is imputing something 
very odd to the working of the congressional brain to say that Congress took care to bar application of the Act to the 
class of employment contracts it most obviously had authority to legislate about in 1925 . . . . It would seem to have 
made sense either to cover all coverable employment contracts or to exclude them all.”) 
33 Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 5, 12 (2014). 
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the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages 
are, if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in this.”34  
Despite evidence and legislative history to the contrary, however, the Supreme Court, in 
keeping with its treatment of the FAA as a superstatute, has extended the law well beyond its 
apparent original intent in the employment context. In 1991’s Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., the Court ruled that the plaintiff could be compelled to pursue his statutory age 
discrimination claim through arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in a securities 
application.35 The Court claimed that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an 
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”36 The Court dismissed Gilmer’s arguments that arbitration 
is an inherently inferior venue to litigation: “Such generalized attacks on arbitration ‘rest on 
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law 
to would-be complainants,’ and as such, they are ‘far out of step with our current strong 
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.’”37  
The Gilmer majority refused to consider Justice Stevens’s dissenting argument that the 
FAA was not intended to cover employment contracts, because Gilmer had not raised the 
argument on appeal, and because his arbitration agreement was not contained in an employment 
agreement, but rather a securities registration application.38 However, the Court explicitly settled 
the question in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, holding that the FAA’s statement that arbitration 
                                                 
34 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing on S. 
4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 
(1923)). 
35 Id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
36 Id. at 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
37 Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). Gilmer’s 
criticisms of arbitration were well-founded, as discussed infra Part II.B. 
38 Id. at 25. 
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agreements must be enforced “in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” 
indicated Congress’s intent that the FAA reach as far as the Commerce Clause might permit.39 
The Court held that when the law explicitly excluded “seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from its scope, it did not mean to 
exclude employment contracts generally, but only those of workers engaged in transportation-
related employment.40 The Court’s 5-4 conservative majority, led by Justice Kennedy, rejected 
the plaintiff’s heavily originalist argument regarding legislative intent, as “[i]t would be 
unwieldy for Congress, for the Court, and for litigants to be required to deconstruct statutory 
Commerce Clause phrases depending upon the year of a particular statutory enactment.”41 Thus, 
the door was flung open to allow mandatory arbitration in employment relations. 
C. The Effect of Supreme Court Arbitration Jurisprudence on Employment Claims 
Since the 1990s, mandatory arbitration has exploded, likely bolstered by the Court’s slim 
but ardent pro-arbitration majority. In a 1995 study of 195 graduates of various industrial 
relations and graduate programs, only 2% of respondents indicated that their firms used 
mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes involving non-unionized employees.42 In 2003, a 
survey of 291 telecommunications employers found that 14% used mandatory arbitration; 
however, since the larger firms tended to be the ones using such agreements, nearly 23% of 
employees were subject to mandatory arbitration.43 A 2010 survey by Fulbright & Jaworski LLP 
                                                 
39 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
40 Id. at 109 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1). 
41 Id. at 117. 
42 Comsti, supra note 33, at 6 (citing Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair: Remedial 
Voice Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. OF MGMT. 27, 31-32, 36 (1995)). 
43 Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprives 
Workers and Consumers of Their Rights, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #414 at 15 (Dec. 7, 2015) (citing 
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11.2 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMP. POLICY J. 405 (2008)). 
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indicated that 27% of employers required mandatory arbitration for non-union disputes.44 In 
2015, Katherine V.W. Stone and Alexander J.S. Colvin estimated that 25% or more of all 
employees in nonunion workplaces are covered by mandatory arbitration agreements.45 
The rapid expansion of mandatory employment arbitration clauses (many, if not most, of 
which likely contain group action bars), alongside the increasing power of these clauses under 
recent Supreme Court decisions, paints a disturbing picture for employee rights advocates. If 
employees are denied access to the courts and to group action by mandatory individual 
arbitration clauses, there would seem to be de facto immunity, in terms of private enforcement, 
for employers who engage in widespread violations of wage and hour laws, so long as the 
expected value of each individual claim is less than the cost to the employee of pursuing the 
claim in arbitration. Indeed, the lower an individual worker’s wage (and potential individual 
claim), the more effective a mandatory arbitration clause will be in preventing employer 
accountability. The Gilmer Court’s reassurance that “[s]o long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function” provides cold comfort if an employer 
may simply price an employee out of her claim with a mandatory group action bar.46 
This growth in mandatory individual arbitration, when combined with increasing hostility 
toward class actions and the heightened certification standards required by Dukes, likely explains 
the lower number of class filings, smaller proposed classes, and fewer (and smaller) settlements 
                                                 
44 Comsti, supra note 33, at 7 (citing Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, Fulbright Litigation Trends, Fulbright’s Seventh 
Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report 43 (2010)). 
45 Stone &Colvin, supra note 43, at 15. 
46 Individual legal claims are often discussed as a type of property right. See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and 
Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059 (May 2012). An analysis of whether group action bars in mandatory 
arbitration employment contracts might deprive employees of a property right might be fruitful, but is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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observed by Selmi and Tsakos.47 If individual arbitration is unlikely to provide a claimant 
employee with an award or settlement that exceeds the cost of bringing the arbitration, then it is 
not in the employee’s economic interests to pursue the arbitration. Since arbitration advocates 
frequently argue that arbitration reduces financial barriers to justice for employees with small 
claims, Part II will compare individual arbitration to litigation through a model of employee 
rights, including a comparison of average employee awards across the two systems, to determine 
which system better provides employees with access to justice.  
II. ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, AND EMPLOYEE ACCESS TO WORKPLACE JUSTICE 
A. The Rationale for Arbitration 
The enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses is frequently justified on the principle 
of freedom of contract. The Supreme Court, in one of its early decisions in the “superstatute” era 
of the FAA, upheld the enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause on these grounds, finding 
that “[a]rbitration . . . is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to 
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”48 Despite the fact that most mandatory 
arbitration clauses are not individually negotiated, but are rather adhesive form contracts, the 
Court has not been sympathetic to attempts to invalidate arbitration agreements on such grounds. 
This is likely because, as the AT&T Mobility majority noted, “the times in which consumer 
contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”49 Therefore, if the fact that an 
arbitration agreement was part of a contract of adhesion were sufficient to challenge its validity, 
the entire field of consumer contracts (and most employment contracts) would be vulnerable. 
                                                 
47 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
48 Volt Info Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
49 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011) (citing Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 
F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
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The AT&T Mobility Court instead focused on perceived advantages of individual 
arbitration over class arbitration, finding that allowing class arbitration would “sacrifice[] the 
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and make[] the process slower, more costly, 
and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”50 While the Court did not 
cite the work of Samuel Estreicher in its decision, its reasoning in this area owes a great deal to 
his 2001 comparison of arbitration to litigation. Estreicher likens litigation to a “Cadillac,” with 
its benefits available only to a privileged few: “The people who benefit under a litigation-based 
system are those whose salaries are high enough to warrant the costs and risks of a law suit 
undertaken by competent counsel; these are the folks who are likely to derive benefit from the 
considerable upside potential of unpredictable jury awards.”51 In contrast, in the absence of 
arbitration, most claimants, whose “stakes are too small and outcomes too uncertain to warrant 
the investment of lawyer time and resources,” are denied a venue in which to pursue their claims 
effectively.52 However, Estreicher argues, arbitration, with its significantly lower average time 
from the filing of a claim to its disposition than in litigation, is more affordable for employees 
with smaller claims. Furthermore, Estreicher points to data suggesting that claimants’ success 
rates are at least as high, if not higher, in arbitration than in court cases.53 Thus, he argues, since 
arbitration is a more informal process than litigation, and a quicker one, less lawyer time is 
required, making it a “Saturn”—an affordable car for the masses, and a better vehicle than the 
“rickshaw” of administrative agency filings available to claimants with relatively small-value 
claims.54 
                                                 
50 Id. at 348. 
51 Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 564.  
54 Id. at 563-64. Estreicher’s critique of litigation, like Coffee’s critique of class actions, is largely grounded in the 
compensationalist mentality, and similarly ignores the deterrent rationale for employment litigation. 
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B. Arbitration Offers Employees Less Access to Workplace Justice than Litigation 
Despite Estreicher’s rosy view of arbitration as a more accessible dispute resolution 
format for the average employee claimant, empirical research comparing outcomes in mandatory 
arbitration to those in litigation in the employment context paints a very different picture. 
Alexander Colvin and Kelly Pike, while crediting Estreicher for taking a more nuanced, policy-
based approach than other arbitration advocates, observe that he wrote before much empirical 
research on arbitration had taken place, and relied on statistics compiled before many employers 
had adopted mandatory arbitration procedures.55 Thus, his argument, as well as many other early 
studies of employment arbitration, examined statistics from individually negotiated arbitration 
agreements, not arbitration procedures promulgated by employers.56 “Individually negotiated 
agreements,” they find, “are likely to involve wealthier, more sophisticated employees who are 
more likely to be able to retain better legal counsel,” who are likely to bring claims based on 
individually negotiated employment contracts.57 Such claims are likely significantly easier to 
prove than claims based in statutory rights, which would explain why the research upon which 
Estreicher relied found comparable success rates in arbitration and litigation, whereas Colvin and 
Pike’s research finds considerably higher success rates in litigation.58 
Colvin and Pike also find that arbitration, despite its supposed informality, is, like the 
courts, an unfriendly venue for pro se claimants. In fact, the strongest predictive factor for 
employee success under an employer promulgated system, they find, is whether the employee 
was represented by an attorney or proceeded pro se.59 Represented claimants in their data set 
                                                 
55 Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of Employment Arbitration 
System has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 60 (2014). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 64. 
58 Id. For discussion of empirical comparisons of litigation and arbitration, see infra text accompanying notes 78-82. 
59 Id. at 78. 
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won nearly 28% of the time, while pro se claimants’ win rate was only 17%.60 Average awards 
across all cases, including losses, were $27,723 for represented claimants, compared to a mere 
$1,781 for pro se claimants.61 Thus, it would appear, arbitration is not a “Saturn”; it instead 
seems to replicate the same disparity that Estreicher critiqued in the litigation system—higher 
success rates, more lucrative awards, and better legal representation for those with sufficiently 
large claims, and little to nothing for those with smaller claims.62  
Individual damages, however, are only one measure by which arbitration should be 
judged. Colvin instead advocates analyzing systems of individual employment relations by 
examining how they affect the balance of access to justice between employees and their 
employers, using a model of four criteria to judge such systems.63 A strict focus on deterrence 
risks undervaluing—and undercompensating—the harms suffered by individual employee 
claimants, whereas analyses such as Coffee’s focus exclusively on compensation at the expense 
of deterrence. Colvin’s model, however, provides substantial attention to both of these aspects of 
dispute resolution while going beyond this dichotomy, also considering the impact of dispute 
resolution systems on access to quality legal representation and on systems of workplace 
relations between employers and employees. Thus, it provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of how a given dispute resolution system will affect employees, both in their daily 
work lives and in disputes with their employers. Comparing arbitration to litigation under this 
model, Colvin concludes that, under mandatory arbitration, employees are likely to have weaker 
procedural protections, a less significant deterrent effect to employer misconduct, and a lessened 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 




ability to obtain legal representation, and that mandatory arbitration does not necessarily lead to 
stronger internal dispute resolution procedures.64  
i. THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS HELD BY EMPLOYEES 
Colvin’s first criterion for judging an individual employment relations system is how that 
system affects the structure of rights held by employees.65 This examination includes both the 
substantive rights provided by federal and state law, and the procedural structures through which 
employees may enforce those substantive rights.66 Arbitration typically offers claimants weaker 
procedural protections than does litigation, including limited discovery and virtually nonexistent 
appellate review.67 Certain common characteristics of arbitration may weigh in the claimant’s 
favor, such as a reduced frequency of summary judgment motions and more relaxed rules of 
evidence.68 However, there are no required due process protections in arbitration. Although the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides some due process protections, employers are 
not required to designate the AAA or any other organization providing due process protections as 
their arbitrators.69 In fact, second only to agreements that specify the AAA as arbitrator, most 
mandatory arbitration clauses do not specify any particular arbitrator, leaving the choice of 
arbitrator and control of the arbitration procedure design entirely in the employer’s hands.70 
The Supreme Court has framed this as a considered tradeoff by employees: “[B]y 
agreeing to arbitrate, one ‘trades the procedures and opportunities for review of the courtroom 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 73. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., id. at 74 (discussing limited discovery in arbitration); Comsti, supra note 33, at 10 (“Because forced 
arbitration is binding, there is no effective appeal from an arbitrator’s decision, which is final, even when it is legally 
wrong.”).  
68 Colvin, supra note 5, at 74. 
69 Id. at 77. 
70 Id. (citing Mark Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment 
Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2014)). 
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for the simplicity, expedition, and informality of arbitration.’”71 However, in the employment 
context, because mandatory arbitration is nearly always imposed unilaterally by management, 
the frequency of mandatory arbitration does not reflect employees’ choice or consideration; it 
rather reflects the employer’s preference for arbitration over litigation.72 Gilmer’s narrative that 
employees in mandatory arbitration have agreed to arbitration after weighing it against litigation 
is pure fiction; rather, most employees have accepted a unilaterally imposed condition of 
employment, weighing mandatory arbitration not against litigation, but against the prospect of 
termination. Colvin finds that this one-sided balance of power leads to significant procedural 
disadvantages for employee claimants under mandatory arbitration compared to litigants, thus 
leading to inequality in such claimants’ ability to enforce their substantive employment rights.73 
ii. SOURCES OF EMPLOYEE POWER 
Next, Colvin asks to what degree a given individual employment relation system affects 
the power differential between employers and employees. Traditional litigation counterbalances 
workplace power differentials by deterring employers from statutory violations with the threat of 
damages.74 Employment statutes not only empower employees to seek individual damages, but 
also allow them to act as “private attorneys general” through litigation, seeking injunctive relief 
through the courts.75 This deterrent power is essential for ensuring that legislative employment 
priorities such as anti-discrimination laws, minimum wage requirements, and overtime 
protections are actually implemented in the workplace. Moreover, the risk of large awards 
                                                 
71 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  
72 Colvin, supra note 5, at 76. 
73 Id. at 78. Colvin notes that the only types of employees that are able to influence the structure of arbitration and 
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75 Comsti, supra note 33, at 26. 
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(whether from substantial individual litigation, or from class action) incentivizes employers to 
act to reduce the risk of litigation, such as by implementing managerial structures that avoid age 
discrimination.76 Thus, litigation is able to translate statutory rights into actual change in the 
workplace through “a process of contested decision-making and negotiated implementation.”77 
In mandatory arbitration, both employee win rates and average award amounts are far 
lower than in litigation. One study found an employee success rate of 36.4% in federal 
employment discrimination trials, and others have found a 57-59% employee success rate in state 
court non-discrimination employment cases.78 In contrast, employees have a win rate of only 
21.4% in AAA mandatory arbitrations.79 Employees also fare worse in mandatory arbitration 
when it comes to damages. In Colvin’s research sample, average award amounts across all court 
cases, including employee losses as well as cases in which no damages were awarded, were 
$143,497 for employment discrimination trials in federal court and $328,008 for non-civil rights 
employment trials in state courts.80 In AAA mandatory arbitration cases examined by Colvin, the 
average award is a mere $23,548—about 1/7 of the federal average and 1/15 of the state 
average—reflecting both smaller awards when employees prevail and the overall lower win rate 
for employees in mandatory arbitration.81 With the increasing prevalence of mandatory 
arbitration, this disparity of outcomes between litigation and mandatory arbitration threatens to 
decrease the impact of employment legislation by reducing litigation’s deterrent effect.82 
                                                 
76 Colvin, supra note 5, at 79. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 79-80 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An 
Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44 (2003); and David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An 
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79 Id. at 80, citing Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and 
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011) 
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It is likely that mandatory group action waivers similarly reduce litigation’s deterrent 
effect, especially in wage and hour claims. The potential individual awards in wage and hour 
claims are frequently too low to make individual legal representation financially viable.83 Since 
group action waivers are enforceable even when they make individual litigation economically 
unviable under Italian Colors, then employees forced to work under such waivers would be 
effectively barred from bringing many, if not most, wage and hour claims. As such waivers 
become more common, this will further reduce the deterrent effect of wage and hour statutes. 
Furthermore, such waivers likely make employees more vulnerable to retaliation for 
pursuing their claims against their employers. When an employer, through a pattern of action, 
has violated the statutory rights of a class of employees who band together in a class action, it is 
difficult for the employer to retaliate against those employees without drawing attention to its 
actions, as retaliation such as mass termination would be nearly impossible to conceal. It would 
be far easier to cloak retaliation against claimants acting individually, in separate actions, under 
the guise of alleged poor performance or insubordination. These waivers, then, are likely to have 
a chilling effect on employees who might willingly join a class action, but are reluctant to assert 
individual arbitration claims for fear of retaliation. 
iii. MECHANISMS OF REPRESENTATION 
To successfully pursue individual employment claims and vindicate their statutory rights, 
employees must be able to obtain effective representation.84 Arbitration advocates have heralded 
the process as one in which employees can proceed pro se, leading, in theory, to employees 
retaining more of their awards by avoiding plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.85 However, this tree has 
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borne little fruit; pro se arbitration claims comprise about 25% of all employment claims, only 
slightly more than the roughly 20% of pro se employment litigation claims.86 Employees are 
seeking counsel in arbitration for good reason: pro se arbitration claimants, like pro se litigants, 
have significantly lower rates of success (measured either as damages or a successful settlement) 
when compared to those with legal representation.87 Thus, effective representation is as essential 
in arbitration as in litigation. 
Due to the disparity in awards between litigation and mandatory arbitration, employees 
face significant hurdles in obtaining legal counsel in mandatory arbitration. Since most 
employment claims are accepted on contingency, the lower average award in arbitration reduces 
the ability of employees to find attorneys willing to take such cases on a contingency basis.88 In a 
survey of 480 employment attorneys, Colvin found that they were nearly twice as likely to accept 
potential clients who were able to proceed in litigation as those who were subject to mandatory 
arbitration.89 Employers, with their greater financial resources, are more likely to be represented 
by employment law specialists in arbitration than are employees, and are similarly more likely to 
be represented by attorneys with more mandatory arbitration experience, leading to a potential 
repeat player effect.90 In contrast, employees are more likely to be represented by generalists, if 
they can obtain representation at all.91 This cuts against the public policy argument that 
mandatory arbitration can help to reduce the barriers against access to justice; in fact, Colvin 
concludes that it strengthens these barriers by reducing employees’ ability to obtain legal 
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representation.92 This effect is almost certainly more pronounced for smaller-value wage and 
hour claims that are not large enough to make individual representation financially viable, but 
where the terms of the mandatory arbitration clause bar group action. 
This finding is further supported by Colvin and Pike’s 2014 study, in which they 
examined the 449 AAA employment arbitration cases that terminated in 2008. They found that 
while 83.1% of claimants under employer promulgated systems earned less than $100,000 per 
year, their claims were of relatively high value.93 The median claim of this group was over 
$167,000, and three quarters of the claims were above $61,985.94 This figure is significant, they 
note, because a 1995 survey of employment lawyers found that damages of at least $60,000 were 
necessary to justify work on a contingent basis.95 This likely creates a screening effect, 
explaining why AAA handles so few employment arbitration cases—a mere 946 in 2008, 
including cases that were settled or otherwise withdrawn prior to a hearing—given that employer 
promulgated procedures cover, in Colvin and Pike’s estimate, about 30 million employees in the 
United States.96 This suggests that, contrary to Estreicher’s view of arbitration as a friendly 
venue for low-value claims, arbitration is subject to the same screening effects as litigation, with 
smaller-value claims being priced out by the cost of obtaining effective representation. 
iv. PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
Colvin’s fourth criterion for evaluating a method of individual employment relations is to 
what degree the method produces patterns of workplace employment relations that protect 
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employment rights.97 Mandatory arbitration is often accompanied by internal grievance 
procedures involving multiple steps prior to arbitration, which can increase employee due 
process rights.98 However, Colvin observes, it is not obvious that mandatory arbitration is 
necessary to encourage employers to implement strong internal grievance procedures.99 
Furthermore, research in this area is likely not representative of the overall state of firms with 
mandatory arbitration, since companies with weaker internal grievance procedures are less likely 
to allow researchers to study their systems, due to the potential for negative publicity.100 Colvin 
concludes that a regime in which employers unilaterally implement rules and procedures (the 
regime of nearly all workplaces with mandatory arbitration) leads to significant variation in 
employees’ access to due process rights and workplace justice.101 Without empirical research on 
the topic, it is impossible to determine what differences there might be in those workplaces that 
bar class actions and arbitrations through mandatory arbitration clauses and those that do not. 
The Gilmer Court may have claimed that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a 
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute”102; however, as this section 
has demonstrated, an employee’s so-called “agreement” to forgo litigation through mandatory 
individual arbitration may well lead to her forgoing her substantive statutory rights when her 
claims are too low to justify legal representation on a contingency fee basis. Part III will 
therefore examine whether public enforcement of these statutory rights by state AGs might serve 
to vindicate employee rights when private enforcement of those rights is effectively barred by 
mandatory individual arbitration. 
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III. THE PARENS PATRIAE POWER AS A REPLACEMENT FOR CLASS ACTIONS 
To the extent that individual arbitration frustrates employees’ attempts to effectively 
vindicate their statutory claims, mandatory individual arbitration clauses thus prevent both 
deterrence of future misconduct and compensation for individual harms. Where these means are 
no longer attainable through private enforcement of employment statutes, private enforcement 
has failed as a means by which employees may vindicate their statutory rights. This Part will 
therefore examine whether public enforcement of those rights through the state attorney general 
parens patriae power might be an effective alternative for the vindication of those rights, using 
Colvin’s model as a lens to understand its effect on employee access to workplace justice. 
A. State Attorneys General and the Parens Patriae Power 
With the general hostility toward the class action of recent decades, and with many 
individually low-value employee claims effectively barred by mandatory individual arbitration 
clauses, some scholars have looked to state attorneys general (“AGs”) as an alternative means to 
fulfill the purposes of employee and consumer protection statutes, as a quasi-class action.103 The 
parens patriae power (literally “parent of the country”) is rooted in English common law, in 
which the state could act as a guardian on behalf of minors and others deemed incapable of 
advocating on their own behalf.104 In the United States, the doctrine has its modern origin at the 
turn of the twentieth century. In Louisiana v. Texas, the Supreme Court found that a state could 
have a “quasi-sovereign” interest in litigation, giving it the power to act through parens 
patriae.105 What exactly the required “quasi-sovereign” interest might be lacked much definition 
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until 1982, when the Court, reviewing its previous eighty years of parens jurisprudence, found 
that successful parens cases included these essential characteristics: 
(1) a state has a quasi-sovereign interest only when it can articulate “an interest 
apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more 
than a nominal party”; (2) a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and 
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general; (3) a state 
has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being denied its rightful status within the 
federal system and in seeing that its citizens are not denied the benefits of that 
system; (4) a state has a quasi-sovereign interest only if it can allege an injury to a 
“sufficiently substantial” segment of its population, but the Court has not 
attempted to draw any “definitive limits” on the proportion that must be adversely 
affected.106 
 
State law, however, can limit the scope of an AG’s parens power.107 This leads to 
significant differences in parens power from state to state. In a 2002 case involving AGs 
from all fifty states and the District of Columbia, the court determined that “fourteen 
states [including the District of Columbia] . . . ha[d] expressly conferred parens patriae 
authority,” that sixteen more “ha[d] express statutory authority to represent consumers” 
in a “functional equivalent” of parens power, another thirteen had the power through 
court decisions or state common law, and that the final eight claimed standing under Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.108 
The broad scope of the parens power, some argue, gives state AGs the ability to 
pursue aggregate litigation on behalf of injured citizens while avoiding the agency costs 
critiqued by Coffee and others. Such policy proposals often replicate Coffee’s 
compensationalist view of the role of class actions, with little focus on the deterrent 
effects of such suits or the other aspects of employee access to justice discussed in Part II 
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of this paper.109 Shortly after AT&T Mobility, Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman argued, 
from a deterrent perspective, that the parens power could also circumvent mandatory 
individual arbitration agreements, because state AGs would not be barred by such 
agreements under agency principles.110 Moreover, they argue that the parens power 
would be beyond the reach of the tightening restrictions of class action certification after 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and would also not be subject to the same notice requirements as a 
damages class action because state AGs do not have the obligation to distribute damages 
to individual victims with any precision—or to distribute damages at all.111 Far more 
concerned about the loss of the deterrent effect of the class action than its goal of 
compensation, they claim that “[l]iberal use of cy pres, escheatment to the public fisc, 
and the application of rough justice principles in distributing awards” would constitute 
sufficient compensation of individual victims.112 
B. Parens Patriae and Employee Access to Workplace Justice 
Advocates of the parens patriae power as a replacement for traditional class actions have 
focused either on the compensationalist or the deterrent functions of litigation, typically arguing 
for the importance of one or the other.113 This section will rather employ Colvin’s more nuanced 
model discussed in Part II to explore the effect of parens suits by state AGs on the equality of 
access to justice between employees and employers. It will compare patriae suits to traditional 
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class actions and to individual mandatory arbitration of low-value claims under a class 
arbitration waiver. 
i. THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS HELD BY EMPLOYEES 
Colvin first asks what types of procedural rights a given dispute resolution system offers. 
Under this criterion, parens suits differ substantially from class actions in several respects. First, 
to the extent one accepts Coffee’s critique of the agency costs of class actions, parens suits may 
address that concern by removing the temptation of private counsel to reach “coupon” 
settlements alongside substantial attorneys’ fees or to forgo injunctive relief in favor of higher 
damages.114 However, the interests of employees involved in a parens suit will not necessarily 
align with those of the prosecuting AG.115 In fact, to proceed in a parens suit, the state must 
show an interest that is distinct from the interests of the citizens in the suit.116 The state’s action 
must be taken on behalf of the interests of all state residents, not just particular individuals, and 
must address the type of general public welfare that the state might “address through its 
sovereign lawmaking powers.”117  
When the interests of affected individual employees conflict with an AG’s conception of 
the general welfare of her state’s citizens, it is unclear how she should balance these competing 
interests.118 Acting on behalf of her state’s citizens, she might prioritize injunctive relief, whereas 
the injured individuals might likely prefer a focus on damages.119 This difficulty is likely to 
increase in the employment realm, where the majority of an AG’s potential parens suits will be 
against employers in her own state. An AG pursuing a parens claim against an out-of-state 
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product manufacturer need not worry about the impact of a significant award on the welfare of 
her state’s citizens. But how would the same AG analyze a similarly large award against a local 
employer, which might reduce that employer’s ability to hire additional employees, or even put 
the employer out of business?120 This difficulty is increased when the political considerations of 
state AGs are considered, particularly in the forty-three states where AGs are directly elected.121 
The need to secure and retain political support from prominent state business owners may lead 
state AGs to seek lighter fines against employers, or even to decline to pursue a parens suit at 
all.122 Thus, while the parens doctrine may appear at first blush to be an improvement over class 
actions’ supposed high agency costs, it has its own threats to employees’ procedural rights. 
Moreover, parens suits lack key procedural protections of class actions. To certify a class 
in a damages suit, the court must find that the class’s shared questions of law or fact 
predominate, and that a class action is superior to other available methods to resolve the 
dispute.123 Such requirements are absent in parens suits.124 Similarly, there is no parens parallel 
to the Rule 23(c) notice requirement for damages class actions.125 However, despite the lack of 
these procedural protections, the general rule is that parens suits preclude any future class action 
litigation just as a prior class action would.126 An injured employee may therefore be barred from 
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future class action litigation by a state AG suit that subordinates her individual interests to those 
of the state’s citizenry or of her employer, or even to the AG’s political ambitions.127 
When compared to the procedural disadvantages of mandatory individual arbitration, 
however, parens suits begin to regain their luster. They retain the significant procedural strengths 
of litigation, such as expansive discovery and appellate review of unfavorable decisions, as well 
as due process protections that may be absent in mandatory arbitration.128 Most fundamentally, 
the possibility of a parens suit offers employees a viable procedure by which to vindicate wage 
and hour claims too small to pursue individually when class action and class arbitration are 
barred. While such employees will have no right to control the method by which the suit 
proceeds, and may have fewer rights than Rule 23 class members, a parens suit at least offers the 
possibility of meaningful injunctive relief and a financially viable path to individual damages. 
ii. SOURCES OF EMPLOYEE POWER 
Colvin’s second criterion of analysis is the effect of a given individual employment 
relations system on employee power to vindicate statutory rights and ensure employer 
compliance. Under this criterion, parens suits may seem appealing to employee rights advocates, 
allowing advocacy-focused state AGs to use the power of the state to secure justice for 
employees. However, relying on state AGs to use their parens power against employers to 
enforce employment laws could cause significant variance among the states in how effectively 
the purposes of these laws are fulfilled, particularly in the wage and hour area. 
Enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses has become a highly partisan issue. For 
example, the twenty-four Senate cosponsors of the 2013 Arbitration Fairness Act were all 
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Democrats; moreover, left-leaning groups such as the AFL-CIO, the ACLU, and the NAACP 
supported the legislation, while conservative organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
and National Association of Manufacturers opposed it.129 While initial Supreme Court majorities 
on pro-arbitration cases were more ideologically diverse, more recent mandatory arbitration 
cases such as AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors have routinely divided the Court along 
traditional liberal-conservative ideological lines.130 Since every state AG but one is either 
directly elected in a partisan race or appointed by a partisan governor or legislative body,131 there 
is thus the potential for a partisan divide in the willingness of state AGs to initiate parens suits to 
circumvent mandatory arbitration clauses.  
Moreover, the general partisan divide among state AGs seems to be increasing. Margaret 
Lemos and Kevin Quinn, in a study of Supreme Court amici briefs filed by state AGs between 
the Court’s 1979 and 2013 terms, have found that while signs of partisanship in Supreme Court 
amici by state AGs briefs were low prior to 2000, partisanship has increased since then: 
To our surprise, we found relatively low rates of interstate conflict in our set of 
state amicus briefs. States agreed far more often than they disagreed, and - until 
recently - most multistate briefs represented bipartisan, not partisan, coalitions of 
AGs. In about 94% of the cases in which any state wrote a merits brief, there was 
no explicit disagreement among the state AGs. Further, for the first twenty years 
of our study [1979-1999], the cosigners of these briefs were generally 
indistinguishable from a random sampling of AGs then in office. The picture 
changes after 2000, when the coalitions of cosigners became decidedly more 
partisan, particularly among Republican AGs.132 
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Although few cases involve states taking opposing positions in amici briefs, within that subset of 
cases, AGs tend to band together in partisan groups, with a similar increase in partisanship after 
the mid-1990s.133 Lemos and Quinn note that primarily Democratic coalitions tended to file 
amici briefs on civil litigation issues, notably including cases involving the relationship between 
arbitration and class actions.134 This group of cases included AT&T Mobility, in which partisan 
groups of state AGs filed amici briefs on both sides, with the Republican-dominated coalition 
arguing for the enforceability of the mandatory arbitration agreement and the Democratic-
dominated coalition arguing for its unconscionability.135 Italian Colors did not feature opposing 
state AG briefs, but a large group of state AGs filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs, arguing 
that where individual claims are financially unviable, mandatory class action and class 
arbitration waivers should be found unenforceable.136 Of the twenty-one AGs joining in the brief, 
seventeen were Democrats and only four were Republicans.137 Lemos and Quinn’s findings, 
coupled with the partisan divisions among state AGs and the highly partisan nature of the 
arbitration dispute, thus suggest that partisanship is likely to play a role when state AGs consider 
whether to use the parens power to pursue collective litigation on behalf of employees barred 
from group action. If this does become a partisan issue, it would likely lead to a disparity in 
employee power among the states based on the partisan affiliation of each state’s AG.  
Moreover, further disparities are likely to arise among employees from different states 
depending on the scope of each state AG’s parens power. The Louisiana constitution, for 
example, grants that state’s AG extremely broad authority, “[a]s necessary for the assertion or 
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protection of any right or interest of the state, . . . to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil 
action or proceeding. . . .”138 The Wisconsin AG, in contrast, lacks any inherent power beyond 
what is explicitly granted by statute to act in parens patriae.139 Thus, even if partisan 
considerations do not prevent a state AG from bringing parens suits, the AG might lack the 
ability to bring a given suit depending upon state law. 
Organized business interests might also deter state AGs from initiating parens suits 
against employers (particularly large ones) within their states.140 Whereas a state AG initiating a 
parens suit within a consumer context is likely to be suing a corporation based outside of her 
state, or even outside of the country, it stands to reason that the overwhelming majority of 
potential parens employment actions would be against in-state employers.141 If a parens suit 
were to yield significant damages against a prominent employer, perhaps leading to layoffs by 
that employer, an elected state AG would be susceptible to attack, either from direct political 
opposition from the employer or from large contributions to opposing political action 
committees.142 Indeed, while all fifty states and the District of Columbia eventually joined the 
action against the tobacco industry, many major tobacco-producing states refused at first to join 
the litigation.143 Thus, just as state AGs might seek lighter fines against in-state employers,144 
they might also decline entirely to bring such suits. 
                                                 
138 Louisiana Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 8. 
139 In re Estate of Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d 254, 261 (1974). 
140 Presumably the forty-three directly elected state AGs would be more vulnerable to such pressure, although the six 
others appointed by state governors or legislatures would likely also feel political pressure to avoid harm to 
prominent in-state employers. 
141 What would matter, for these purposes, is not where the employer is incorporated, but rather where the employer 
employs residents of the AG’s state. 
142 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 103, at 674. 
143 Lemos, supra note 122, at 729. 
144 See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text. 
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If there is in fact a partisan divide among state AGs in their willingness to pursue parens 
suits on behalf of employees, that divide could perhaps be ameliorated, to the extent that it 
results from a desire to avoid the political consequences of pursuing such suits against 
employers, by empowering independent review commissions to determine which suits to pursue. 
Such commissions could act as a clearing house by soliciting employee claims, reviewing their 
validity, and recommending—or ordering—that the state AG act or not act upon them. 
Depending on state law, forming such commissions would either require action by the state AG 
or the state legislature, meaning that partisan resistance to the expansion of parens suits would 
have to be overcome one way or another. But once a commission was in place, the state AG 
would be largely insulated from the decision to pursue a parens suit.145  
However, under the status quo, state AGs would presumably be responsible for the 
decision to take up any parens suits that they are empowered to bring. Thus, to the degree that 
parens suits become the dominant method of vindication of employees’ statutory rights, there is 
a significant risk of wide disparities across state lines based on the state AGs’ partisan affiliation, 
the scope of their parens powers, and their vulnerability to political pressure from in-state 
employers. This potential disparity is less significant, however, than that between employees 
who are barred from group action and those who are not, since parens patriae gives employees 
barred from group action at least some chance at an economically viable path to vindication. 
iii. MECHANISMS OF REPRESENTATION 
Compared to a private class action, parens patriae suits would at first seem to reduce the 
ability of employee claimants to ensure that they have skilled legal representation. In a parens 
suit, the attorney for the “class” is the state AG’s office (or any private counsel they choose to 
                                                 
145 Such commissions would, of course, likely raise state constitutional questions to the extent that they limited AG 
power, but such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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contract with); employee claimants would have no control over their representation.146 In a class 
action, of course, few (if any) class members actively choose their counsel. However, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the court appoint class counsel that is able to “fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class,” including a consideration of counsel’s experience 
in class actions and other complicated litigation, relevant law, and available resources.147 The 
parens framework, in contrast, lacks any formal equivalent of a Rule 23 challenge to the 
adequacy of counsel.148 Lemos suggests that the best available option to challenge adequacy of 
counsel in a parens suit would be a subsequent private suit attempting to relitigate the subject of 
the parens suit.149 However, in a parens suit, there is a rebuttable presumption that government 
representation is adequate.150 Most courts set a high bar to rebut this presumption, requiring “a 
strong affirmative showing that the sovereign is not fairly representing the interests of the 
applicant.”151 Thus, employees seeking to improve the quality of their counsel in a parens suit 
will likely face an uphill battle through private litigation to overcome the presumption of 
adequacy of counsel by state AGs. 
However, while members of a private class action do have broader formal rights under 
Rule 23 than individuals covered by a parens suit, those rights are rarely enforced. Robert 
Klonoff, in an extensive study of hundreds of class certification decisions published between 
1994 and 2003, found that “the vast majority” of class certifications contained “little or no 
                                                 
146 At the Supreme Court level, at least, state AGs have had a reputation as weak (and underfunded) litigators 
compared to experienced private counsel well into the 1980s. Lemos & Quinn, supra note 132, at 1236-37. 
However, this has been improved by increased funding for state AGs and by coordination through the National 
Association of Attorneys General Supreme Court Project. Id. at 1237-38. 
147 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). 
148 Lemos, supra note 115, at 503.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 509 (citing 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 24.03 (3d ed. 2007)). 
151 Id. (quoting United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 985 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
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analysis” of class counsel adequacy.152 He also found that many courts employed the same 
presumption of adequacy critiqued by Lemos in the parens context, rather than requiring an 
affirmative showing of adequacy by prospective class counsel.153 Moreover, courts often use a 
highly limited definition of inadequacy, such as finding inadequacy only when there is a clear 
conflict of interest.154 Therefore, the difference between private class actions and parens suits—
on this criterion, at least—seems to be more theoretical than practical. 
Moreover, other options for ensuring adequate counsel remain if an understaffed or 
underfunded state AG is willing to cooperate with private firms. In such situations, states could 
contract private firms with class action expertise on a contingency fee basis to prosecute parens 
actions, as many states did in the tobacco lawsuit.155 To increase employee control over the 
choice of counsel, state AGs could involve affected employees in the contracting decision in 
some way, such as inviting them to participate in interviews of prospective counsel or to provide 
feedback on application proposals, thereby increasing their agency under Colvin’s third criterion.  
Gilles and Friedman argue that state AG oversight of any settlements reached by 
contracted private class counsel would address Coffee’s concern that class counsel would act in 
its own financial best interest at the expense of the interests of the class.156 They note, however, 
that such arrangements might risk “pay-to-play” abuses in which political donors are favored in 
selection of private counsel.157 This problem would not be unique to parens suits, since states 
routinely contract work out to the private sector and must deal with the danger of corruption.158 
                                                 
152 Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of Representation” 
Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 673 (Fall 2004). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 103, at 668-69. 
156 Id. at 671. 
157 Id. at 670. 
158 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Public Values in an Era of Privatization: Extending Public Law Norms Through 
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (March 2003). Privatization of state services is, of course, not without its 
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However, any involvement of affected employees in the contracting process should be carefully 
considered to ensure that it does not lead to increased opportunities for corruption. 
To the extent that the state effectively performs oversight in other contracting situations, 
parens suits should not present any unusual problems or difficulties. Thus, even if there is some 
difference in employees’ ability to ensure adequate representation through class actions or 
parens suits, that can be addressed through the use of private counsel in parens suits. When 
parens actions are compared to individual private arbitration of low-value claims under this 
criterion, the balance weighs heavily in favor of parens suits, since employees would be unlikely 
to attract competent representation with such claims; representation provided by the state will 
certainly be better than no representation at all.159 
iv. PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
Colvin’s final criterion is whether a system of dispute resolution produces patterns of 
employment relations in the workplace that advance employees’ rights. Comparison of class 
actions, parens suits, and mandatory individual arbitration will necessarily be speculative, since 
the use of parens suits to address large-scale employee statutory right violations has been very 
limited. It seems logical, however, that to the extent that parens suits are comparable to class 
actions in their success in vindicating employees’ statutory rights, they would exert similar 
pressures on employers to develop robust alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve 
individual complaints before they could be bundled together into a group action, regardless of 
whether that action is public or private in nature. Parens suits would thus, like class actions, 
seem far more likely than mandatory individual arbitration to create such pressure with regards 
                                                 
own controversies. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (Oct. 2003) 
(analyzing privatization as a form of delegation of state power, and questioning whether accountability structures 
can be created to monitor whether such delegation is done constitutionally). 
159 See discussion supra Section II.B.iii. 
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to statutory rights that tend to create low-value claims, since the chances of success in a group 
parens action would be higher than through individual arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
If employers’ use of mandatory arbitration clauses with group action bars continues to 
increase, and if the FAA continues to enjoy its status as a superstatute, parens patriae litigation 
seems to be the best available method for employees to vindicate claims that are too individually 
small to attract competent legal representation, and thus unlikely to succeed in individual 
arbitration. However, it does not appear that parens suits will be nearly as effective as class 
actions in addressing the power differential between employers and employees and effecting the 
statutory purposes of the FLSA and other employment statutes. If parens suits are indeed going 
to fill the gap left by employment class actions, it is likely that significant disparities will 
develop across state lines based on state AG partisanship, resources, and inherent powers. 
Moreover, while parens suits might perform a similar deterrent function to class actions, they 
lack the procedural protections of the compensation function of class actions. If state AGs do not 
use their parens powers thoughtfully, the doctrine could be vulnerable to many of the same 
critiques as class actions, particularly from a compensationalist perspective, which could lead to 
state legislatures moving to curtail these powers.160 Despite these difficulties, however, for 
employees barred from group action but hoping to vindicate low-value statutory claims, a parens 
patriae suit might be the only game in town. 
                                                 
160 This risk could be reduced if the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) were to serve as a 
clearinghouse for best practices in state parens suits, which could mitigate some aspects of the risk of procedural 
disparities developing among states. The NAAG could, for example, develop guidelines for balancing individual 
compensation with injunctive relief (see supra text accompanying notes 118-122), create model legislation for 
independent review commissions for potential parens suits (see supra text accompanying note 145), and promulgate 
best practices for the selection of private counsel (see supra text accompanying notes 155-158).  
